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Abstract 
The standard New Keynesian model suffers from the so-called .macro-micro pricing conflict: 
in order to match the dynamics of inflation implied by macroeconomic data, the model needs 
to assume an average duration of price contracts which is much longer than what is observed 
in micro data. Here I show how departing from the standard model’s assumption of a 
perfectly competitive labor market can help resolve the pricing conflict. I do so by assuming 
search frictions in the labor market. In this framework, labor becomes firm-specific and 
marginal cost curves become upward-sloping. This mechanism reduces the slope of the New 
Keynesian Phillips curve given a frequency of price adjustment. Conversely, given an 
estimate of this slope, my model implies shorter price durations than the standard model. For 
a plausible calibration and for different slope values, my model consistently delivers price 
durations that are roughly half of those implied by the standard model. 
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1 Introduction
The standard New Keynesian model of the business cycle has recently been subject to the
following criticism. The key equation of this model is the so-called New Keynesian Phillips
curve, which describes the dynamics of ination. The slope of this curve, which measures the
elasticity of ination with respect to real marginal costs, is a function of the average duration
of price contracts in the model. Given an estimate of the slope parameter, one can then infer
the average price duration implied by the model. Most estimates of the slope parameter imply
average price durations in the range of 5 to 9 quarters.1 However, recent studies based on
micro data show that, at least in the US, rms change prices as often as 1.5 quarters.2 Altig et
al. (2004) refer to this divergence in estimated average frequencies of price adjustment as the
micro-macro pricing conict.
Some authors, including Woodford (2005) and Altig et al. (2004), have pointed out that
the origin of this conict may be found in the absence of real rigidities in the standard New
Keynesian model. The concept of real rigidities, as dened by Ball and Romer (1990), refers to
those real factors that increase the slope of the rms real marginal cost curve. Real rigidities
have the e¤ect of reducing the size of individual price changes in response to aggregate uc-
tuations. A rm considering for instance a price reduction anticipates that the price cut will
increase demand for its product for the duration of the price contract. If marginal cost curves
are increasing in output, then the projected rise in marginal costs leads the rm to choose a
smaller price cut than the one initially considered. Once pricing decisions are aggregated, real
rigidities have the e¤ect of reducing the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, given an
average duration of price contracts. The ip side of the coin is that, given an estimate of the
slope parameter, a model with real rigidities leads one to infer a shorter average price duration.
Therefore, real rigidities become key to resolving the micro-macro pricing conict.
In the standard New Keynesian model, labor can be costlessly and instantaneously relocated
among rms in a perfectly competitive market. This implies that the marginal cost of labor is
given simply by the market hourly wage, which is independent of the rms output. Therefore,
the assumption of a perfectly competitive labor market is partly responsible for the lack of real
rigidities in the New Keynesian model.
This paper shows how departing from the assumption of a perfectly competitive labor
market can introduce real rigidities in the New Keynesian model and thus help resolve the
micro-macro pricing conict. I do so by assuming that the labor market is subject to search
1See e.g. Gali and Gertler (1999), Altig et al. (2004) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004).
2See Bils and Klenow (2004) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004).
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and matching frictions, as in the framework popularized by Pissarides (2000, ch. 1). Search
frictions imply that it is costly and time-consuming for rms to nd suitable workers. In this
context, employment relationships have a long-term nature, i.e. labor becomes rm-specic.
Because it takes time to hire new workers, the only way a rm can expand production in the
short-run is by increasing the number of hours worked by its current employees. However, Nash
wage bargaining between rms and workers implies that the latter must be compensated for
the labor disutility su¤ered in each period. Under the realistic assumption that labor disutility
is convex in hours worked, short-run marginal costs become increasing in hours per employee
and therefore in output.3 That is, search frictions give rise to real rigidities.
I then quantify the extent to which this mechanism contributes to reconciling the model
average frequency of price adjustment with the frequency observed in micro data. I show
that, for di¤erent estimates of the slope parameter that have been provided by the empirical
literature, the model with search frictions consistently delivers average price durations that
are roughly half of those implied by the standard model. Therefore, search frictions and the
resulting rm-specicity of labor prove helpful in bringing the model closer to the data in terms
of the average frequency of price changes.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. On the one hand, Woodford
(2005), Altig et al. (2004) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005) have shown how departing from
the assumption of a perfectly competitive rental market for homogenous capital can create
real rigidities in the New Keynesian model. In particular, these authors assume that capital
is rm-specic, implying that a rms capital stock is predetermined and can only by changed
by varying the rate of investment. However, Altig et al. (2004) acknowledge that assuming
that the rms entire stock of capital is predetermined is probably unrealistic, and that rm-
specicity of some other factor of production may be required. Here I show how rm-specicity
in labor gives rise to a new source of real rigidity.4
On the other hand, recent years have seen an explosion in research on models that com-
bine the New Keynesian and search and matching frameworks. Most of this literature however
assumes that pricing decisions are made by a subset of rms that are not subject to search fric-
tions, and that vacancy-posting decisions are made by rms that do not set prices.5 Since both
3A marginal cost that increases with hours per employee has a real-world counterpart in those arrangements
that make it more and more costly for rms to raise work hours above normal levels, such as overtime premia.
See e.g. Hall (1980) and Bils (1987).
4Notice that rm-specic labor is di¤erent from the kind of industry-specic labor markets considered by
Woodford (2003, 2005). In the latter case, the labor market in each industry is still perfectly competitive, and
workers can still be costlessly and instantaneously relocated among rms in the same industry.
5See e.g. Walsh (2003b), Trigari (2005), Christo¤el and Linzert (2005), Andres et al. (2006) and Thomas
(2007). Examples of models that do not resort to this assumption are Krause and Lubik (2005) and Blanchard
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decisions are forward-looking, disentangling them allows to simplify the models considerably.
This assumption however is not innocuous. As I show here, if rms (realistically) make both
pricing and vacancy-posting decisions, the resulting interaction gives rise to real rigidities. I
also show how a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve can still be derived in this framework,
using a method similar to the one developed by Woodford (2005) in his model of rm-specic
capital.
In independent work, Kuester (2007) identies a real rigidity mechanism which is similar to
the one presented here. His framework features rm-worker pairs where nominal wages as well
as prices are bargained in a staggered fashion. This creates a source of real rigidity in wage
bargaining which works in the same way as the real rigidity in price bargaining. This allows
him to increase the sluggishness of both ination and real wages in response to macroeconomic
shocks. Our papers also di¤er in focus. Kuester evaluates the ability of his model to match
the impulse responses of macro variables, including unemployment and vacancies, to monetary
shocks as identied by a structural VAR. Here, I focus on how search frictions can bring the
average duration of price contracts implied by macro estimates of the New Keynesian Phillips
curve closer to the micro data.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model. Section
3.3 analyzes individual price setting when rms make both pricing and hiring decisions. Section
3.4 analyzes the presence of real rigidities in the model and how this a¤ects ination dynamics.
Section 3.5 calibrates the model and quanties the extent to which search frictions contribute
to resolving the macro-micro pricing conict. Section 3.6 concludes.
2 The model
I now present a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the labor market.
The model therefore brings together two frameworks that have become the standard for an-
alyzing the monetary transmission mechanism and the cyclical behavior of the labor market,
respectively. Relative to a standard real business cycle (RBC) model with perfectly compet-
itive labor markets, the New Keynesian elements are monopolistic competition and staggered
price-setting on the part of rms, whereas search frictions in the labor market are represented
by a matching function that constraints the ability of unemployed workers and vacant jobs to
and Gali (2006). The former uses quadratic costs of adjusting prices, rather than staggered price-setting. Such
a model does not allow one to address the macro-micro pricing conict, because all rms change prices in
every period. Blanchard and Gali (2006) use staggered price setting, but do not analyze the presence of real
rigidities in such a framework.
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be matched to each other.
2.1 The matching function
The search frictions in the labor market are summarized by a matching function,
m(vt; ut);
where vt is the total number of vacancies and ut is the total number of unemployed workers.
Normalizing the labor force to 1, ut also represents the unemployment rate. The function m is
strictly increasing and strictly concave in both arguments. I assume constant returns to scale
in the matching function.6 The matching rate for unemployed workers, or job-nding rate, is
given by
m(vt; ut)
ut
= m

vt
ut
; 1

 p(t);
where t  vt=ut is an indicator of labor market tightness. Similarly, the matching rate for
vacancies is given by
m(vt; ut)
vt
= m

1;
1
vt=ut

 q(t):
The functions p(t) and q(t) are increasing and decreasing in t, respectively: in a tighter
labor market, it is easier to nd jobs and harder to nd workers. Notice that p(t) = tq(t).
2.2 Households
In the presence of unemployment risk, we may observe di¤erences in consumption levels be-
tween employed and unemployed consumers. However, under the assumption of perfect insur-
ance markets, consumption is equalized across consumers. This is equivalent to assuming the
existence of a large representative household, as in Merz (1995). In this household, a fraction
nt of its members are employed in a measure-one continuum of rms. The remaining fraction
ut = 1  nt search for jobs. All members pool their income so as to ensure equal consumption
across members.
Household welfare is given by
Ht = u(ct) 
Z 1
0
nt(i)v(ht(i))di+ Ht+1 (1)
6See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for empirical evidence of constant returns to scale in the matching
function for several industrialized economies.
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where u() is strictly increasing and strictly concave, v() is strictly increasing and strictly
convex, nt(i) and ht(i) represent the number of workers and hours per worker respectively in
rm i 2 [0; 1], and ct is the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption basket,
ct 
Z 1
0
ct(i)
 1
 di
 
 1
;
where  > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution across di¤erentiated goods. Cost minimiza-
tion implies that the nominal cost of consumption is given by Ptct, where
Pt 
Z 1
0
Pt(i)
1 di
 1
1 
is the corresponding price index. The households budget constraint is given by
Mt 1 + (1 + it 1)Bt 1 + Tt
Pt
+
Z 1
0
nt(i)wt(i)di+t  ct + Bt +Mt
Pt
; (2)
whereMt 1 and Bt 1 are holdings of money and one-period nominal bonds, respectively, it 1 is
the nominal interest rate, Tt is a cash transfer from the government (which may be negative),
wt(i) is the real wage paid by rm i and t are aggregate real prots (which are reverted to
households in a lump-sum manner).
Employed members separate from their jobs at the exogenous rate , whereas unemployed
members nd jobs at the rate p(t). Therefore, the households employment rate evolves ac-
cording to the following law of motion,
nt+1 = (1  )nt + p(t)(1  nt): (3)
It is useful at this point to nd the utility that the marginal worker in rm i contributes to the
household. Equations (1), (2) and (3) imply that
@Ht
@nt(i)
= u0(ct)wt(i)  v(ht(i)) + Et

(1  ) @Ht+1
@nt+1(i)
  p(t)
Z 1
0
@Ht+1
@nt+1(j)
vt(j)
vt
dj

; (4)
where p(t)
vt(j)
vt
is the probability of being matched to rm j. The right hand side of equation
(4) consists of the utility value of the real wage net of labor disutility, plus the continuation
value of the job in rm i, minus the value of searching for other jobs.
I assume the existence of a standard cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on the purchase of
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consumption goods. Assuming that goods markets open after the closing of nancial markets,
the households nominal expenditure in consumption cannot exceed the amount of cash left
after bond transactions have taken place,
Ptct Mt 1 + Tt  Bt: (5)
Cash transfers are given by Tt =M st  M st 1, whereM st is exogenous money supply. The growth
rate in money supply, ut  log(M st =M st 1), follows an autoregressive process,
ut = mut 1 + "
m
t ; (6)
where "mt is an iid monetary shock with standard deviation m.
Assuming that the nominal interest rate (i.e. the opportunity cost of holding money) is
always positive, equation (5) holds with equality. In equilibrium, money demand equals money
supply, Mt = M st , which implies Mt 1 + Tt = Mt. Combining this with (5) and the fact that
bonds are in zero net supply (Bt = 0), I obtain
Ptct =Mt: (7)
2.3 Firms
Prots in rm i 2 [0; 1] are given by
t(i) =
Pt(i)
Pt
ydt (i)  wt(i)nt(i)  vt(i) + Ett;t+1t+1(i); (8)
where Pt(i) and ydt (i) are the rms nominal price and sales, respectively, vt(i) are vacancies
posted in period t and t;T  T t u
0(cT )
u0(ct) is the stochastic discount factor between periods t
and T . Due to imperfect substitutability among individual goods, the rm faces the following
demand curve for its product,
ydt (i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 
yt; (9)
where aggregate demand is given by
yt = ct + vt: (10)
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Once the rm has chosen a price, it commits to supply whichever amount is demanded at that
price, yst (i) = y
d
t (i). The rms production technology is given by
yst (i) = Atnt(i)ht(i);
where nt(i)ht(i) is total labor input. At is an exogenous aggregate technology shock, the log of
which, at  lnAt, follows an autoregressive process,
at = aat 1 + "
a
t ; (11)
where "at is an iid shock with standard deviation a.
In each period, the individual rm loses a fraction  of its workers and posts a number vt(i)
of vacancies. Assuming that rms are large, each rm lls a fraction q(t) of vacancies with
certainty. New hires become productive in the following period. This reects the time involved
in searching for suitable workers and training them. Therefore, a rms workforce nt(i) is given
at the start of period t, and has the following law of motion,
nt+1(i) = (1  )nt(i) + q(t)vt(i): (12)
Notice that, since nt(i) is predetermined and the rm is demand-constrained, in the short run
the rm has to adjust hours per worker so as to provide the required amount of output. Using
the rms production function, hours per worker are given by
ht(i) =
ydt (i)
Atnt(i)
: (13)
I assume the rm has discretion over the labor e¤ort that its workers must provide. However,
workers must be compensated for this e¤ort according to a wage schedule agreed by rm and
workers. The derivation of this wage schedule is presented next.
2.3.1 Wage bargaining
As is standard in the search and matching literature, I assume that wages are determined by
the Nash bargaining solution. This requires dening the surplus value derived by both employer
and employee from their employment relationship. The worker surplus in units of consumption,
8
which I denote by Swt (i)  @Ht=@nt(i)u0(ct) , is given by equation (4) divided by u0(ct), that is,
Swt (i) = wt(i)  w¯ t(i) + (1  )Ett;t+1S
w
t+1(i);
where
w
¯ t
(i)  v(ht(i))
u0(ct)
+ p(t)Ett;t+1S
w
t+1 (14)
and Swt+1 
R
Swt+1(i)
vt(j)
vt
dj is average worker surplus in period t+1. The term w
¯ t
(i) represents
the opportunity cost to the worker, and includes labor disutility and the value of searching for
other jobs. On the rms side, since all workers are the same and therefore contribute equally
to the rms revenue, the rm derives the following surplus from each worker,
Sft (i) =
Pt(i)
Pt
ydt (i)
nt(i)
  wt(i) + (1  )Ett;t+1Sft+1(i):
The rm surplus equals the workers contribution to current prots plus what the worker
is expected to contribute in the future should she remain in the rm (which happens with
probability 1 ). Letting  denote the rms bargaining power. Nash wage bargaining implies
that the rm receives a fraction  of the joint match surplus, Sft (i) + S
w
t (i), that is,
(1  )Sft (i) = Swt (i):
Combining the latter with the expressions for worker and rm surplus, I obtain the following
real wage equation,
wt(i) = (1  )Pt(i)
Pt
ydt (i)
nt(i)
+ w
¯ t
(i); (15)
Using the denition of w
¯ t
(i), equation (14), we can express the real wage as
wt(i) = (1  )Pt(i)
Pt
ydt (i)
nt(i)
+ 

v(ht(i))
u0(ct)
+ p(t)Ett;t+1S
w
t+1

: (16)
The real wage is a weighted average of the workers contribution to revenue and the opportunity
cost to the worker. Notice that the worker is (partially) compensated for the incurred labor
disutility, v(ht(i))
u0(ct) . The latter is convex in ht(i), which implies that the rm nds it more and
more expensive to increase output by increasing hours per worker. This could represent real-
world arrangements, such as overtime premia, which are designed to make rms respect the
value of workerstime (see e.g. Hall, 1980, and Bils, 1987). Due to the cost and time involved
in hiring workers, overtime may be a reasonable way to expand production in the short run.
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However, in prolonged periods of high demand the rm must eventually hire workers.
2.3.2 Vacancy posting decision
The rm chooses the number of vacancies vt(i) that maximizes prots (given by equation 8)
subject to equation (12). This yields the following rst order condition,
 = q(t)Ett;t+1
@t+1(i)
@nt+1(i)
: (17)
The contribution of the marginal worker to prots is given by
@t(i)
@nt(i)
=

 @wt(i)
@nt(i)

nt(i)  wt(i) + (1  )Ett;t+1
@t+1(i)
@nt+1(i)
: (18)
Notice in particular that, in a context of monopolistic competition and infrequent price ad-
justment, once the rm has set a price its revenue is independent of nt(i). Therefore, the
contribution of the marginal worker to ow prots is given, not by the marginal revenue prod-
uct of the worker (as in standard RBC models), but by the reduction in the wage bill.7 From
equations (16) and (13), such reduction is given by
 @wt(i)
@nt(i)

nt(i) = (1  )Pt(i)
Pt
ydt (i)
nt(i)
+ 
v0(ht(i))
u0(ct)
ht(i): (19)
That is, an additional worker reduces the wage bill in two ways: rst, the same revenue must be
shared among more workers; second, the same level of output can be produced with a smaller
number of hours per worker, which in turn reduces the real wage to be paid to each worker.
Using (16), (17), (18) and (19) the rms vacancy posting decision becomes

q(t)
= Ett;t+1



v0(ht+1(i))ht+1(i)  v(ht+1(i))
u0(ct+1)
  p(t+1)t+1;t+2Swt+2

+ (1  ) 
q(t+1)

:
(20)
According to equation (20), rms incentives to hire are driven by uctuations in the term
v0(ht(i))ht(i) v(ht(i))
u0(ct) , which represents the gap between marginal and average labor disutility (in
terms of consumption) multiplied by hours per worker. The convexity of v(h) implies that
v0(h)h   v(h) is positive and strictly increasing in h. Therefore, as hours increase, rms have
a stronger incentive to hire more workers in order to prevent labor costs from increasing too
7This result is analogous to the one in Woodfords (2005) model of rm-specic capital, where the marginal
contribution of capital to ow prots is given by the marginal reduction in the wage bill, rather than the
marginal revenue product of capital.
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much.
2.3.3 Pricing decision
As is standard in the New Keynesian literature, I use the Calvo (1983) model of staggered
price setting. Each period, a randomly selected fraction  of rms cannot change their price.
Therefore,  also represents the probability that a rm is not able to change its price in the
following period. This allows me to write the part of the rms prots that depends on its
current price as
Et
1X
T=t
T tt;T 
2664Pt(i)PT
1 
yT   nT (i)
v

Pt(i)
PT
 
yT
ATnT (i)

u0(cT )
3775 ; (21)
where I have used equation (16) to substitute for the real wage in (8), and I have used equations
(9) and (13) to write demand and hours per worker in terms of the current price, Pt(i). When
a rm has the chance to reset its price, it chooses Pt(i) so as to maximize (21). The rst order
condition is given by the standard pricing equation in the Calvo model,
Et
1X
T=t
T tt;TP

T yT

P t (i)
PT
  
   1mcT;t(i)

= 0; (22)
where P t (i) is the pricing decision and
mcT jt(i) 
v0

P t (i)
PT
 
yT
ATnT jt(i)

u0(cT )AT
(23)
is the rms real marginal cost in period T , conditional on the rm not having changed its
price since period t (similarly for nT jt(i)). Therefore, real marginal costs are given by the ratio
between the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, v
0(hT )
u0(cT )
, and the
marginal product of labor, AT . Notice that the rms pricing decision does not depend on its
bargaining power, . This is because, under Nash wage bargaining, rm surplus is proportional
to the joint surplus of the employment relationship, which is independent of .
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3 Relative dynamics of the rm
In what follows, I consider a rst order approximation of the equilibrium conditions around
a zero-ination steady state. For any variable et(i), let e^t(i)  log(et(i)=e) denote its log-
deviation from its steady state value, e. Also let ~et(i)  e^t(i)   e^t denote the value of e^t(i)
relative to its cross-sectional average, e^t 
R 1
0
e^t(i)di. I assume the following functional forms
for preferences over consumption and labor, as well as the matching function,
u(c) =
c1 
 1
1   1 ;
v(h) =
h1+
1 + 
;
m(v; u) = vu1 ;
where ;  > 0 and  2 (0; 1). Therefore,  represents the convexity of labor disutility.
Log-linearization of the rms pricing decision, equation (22), yields
logP t (i) = (1  )Et
1X
T=t
()T t
cmcT jt(i) + logPT  : (24)
Equation (23) and our functional forms imply that the real marginal cost in period T  t of a
rm that has not changed its price since period t can be expressed as
cmcT jt(i) = cmcT   (logP t (i)  logPT )  ~nT jt(i); (25)
where cmcT = y^T +  1c^T   (1 + )aT   n^T (26)
is the average real marginal cost. Notice that a rms relative marginal cost is decreasing in
its relative stock of workers, ~nT jt(i). Having more workers allows the rm to produce a certain
amount of output with a smaller number of hours per worker, which reduces the marginal labor
disutility of its workers and therefore its marginal costs. I now combine (24) and (25) to obtain
(1 + ) logP t (i) = (1  )Et
1X
T=t
()T t
cmcT + (1 + ) logPT   ~nT jt(i) : (27)
This expression for a rms pricing decision is very similar to the one produced by a standard
New Keynesian model (see e.g. Walsh 2003a, chap. 3). The only di¤erence is the presence
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of the Et~nT jt(i) terms, which reects the fact that a rms marginal cost is decreasing in its
relative number of workers. These additional terms complicate the analysis in the following
way. In order to determine logP t (i), we need to solve for the expected path of ~nT jt(i). The
latter however depends on the rms current and future expected vacancy posting decisions,
which in turn depend on the price chosen today. Solving for the rms pricing decision therefore
requires that one considers the e¤ect of a rms relative price on the evolution of its relative
employment stock.
In what follows, I adapt Woodfords (2005) solution method for a rms relative dynamics
to the present context.8 Notice that, in a log-linear approximation, the rms pricing decision is
a linear function of the state of the economy and its individual state, n^t(i). On the other hand,
since price-setters are randomly chosen, their average employment stock coincides with the
economy-wide average employment stock. Therefore, it is plausible to guess that a rms pricing
decision, relative to the average pricing decision, is proportional to its relative employment
stock,
logP t (i) = logP

t    ~nt(i): (28)
I now log-linearize the vacancy posting decision, equation (20), and rescale the resulting ex-
pression by y
n
to obtain
sv

(1  )^t = Et

1


h^t+1(i) +
 1
1 + 
c^t+1

  p()Swy
h
^t+1 + ^t+1;t+2 + S^
w
t+2
i
+
sv

Et^t;t+1 + (1  )
sv

(1  )Et^t+1; (29)
where   
 1 is the monopolistic mark-up, sv  vy is the steady-state share of vacancy
posting costs in GDP, and Swy  nS
w
y
.9 Notice that h^t+1(i) is the only idiosyncratic term in
equation (29). h^t+1(i) will depend on the rms demand in t+ 1 (which in turn depends on its
price in t+ 1) as well as on its stock of workers at the beginning of t+ 1. It is now possible to
obtain the following result.10
Proposition 1 Let relative pricing decisions be given by equation (28), up to a log-linear ap-
8Woodford (2005) uses his method in a model with where capital, rather than labor, is rm-specic.
9In the derivation of equation (29), I have used the fact that, in the steady state, mc = v
0(h)
u0(c)
1
A = 
 1. Since
A = ynh , it follows that
v0(h)
u0(c)h =
1

y
n . I have also used the law of motion of employment in the steady state,
q()v = n.
10The proofs of all propositions are in the Appendix.
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proximation. Then the relative employment stock of any rm evolves according to
~nt+1(i) =  n (logPt(i)  logPt) ; (30)
where
n =

1  (1  )  : (31)
Intuitively, rms with a higher price in the current period also expect to have a higher price
in the next period, which means that they also expect lower demand. Anticipating this, these
rms post a number of vacancies that leaves them with a smaller workforce than the average
rm in the next period.
Proposition 1 allows me to write the expected path of a price-setters relative employment
stock in the following way,
Et
1X
T=t
()T t~nT jt(i) = ~nt(i) + Et
1X
T=t
()T t~nT+1jt(i) (32)
= ~nt(i)  nEt
1X
T=t
()T t (logP t (i)  logPT ) :
Using expression (32) in equation (27), I can write the rms pricing decision as
(1 + ) logP t (i) = (1  )Et
1X
T=t
()T t [cmcT + (1 + ) logPT ]  (1  )~nt(i); (33)
where      n. Equation (33) is the solution to the rms pricing decision, given its
individual state, ~nt(i), and the state of the economy. Averaging (33) across price-setters, and
using the fact that the latter are randomly chosen, I obtain
(1 + ) logP t = (1  )Et
1X
T=t
()T t [cmcT + (1 + ) logPT ] : (34)
Substracting (34) from (33) yields
(1 + )(logP t (i)  logP t ) =  (1  )~nt(i):
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This is consistent with my initial guess, equation (28), only if
  =
(1  )
1 +    n : (35)
Therefore, if relative pricing decisions and relative employment stocks are to have a solution,
the latter is given by equations (28) and (30), respectively, where the parameters   and n
must satisfy equations (31) and (35). I now analyze whether such a solution exists.
3.1 Existence of solution
Using (31) to substitute for n in (35), I obtain the following equation for  ,
  =
(1  )
1 +    


1 (1 )
 :
This can be written as
a( )2 + b  + c = 0; (36)
where
a  (1 + )(1  ); (37)
b    [1 + (2     )] ; (38)
c  (1  ): (39)
The quadratic equation (36) has two solutions. The latter are real numbers if and only if
b2   4ac > 0. The following result establishes that this is indeed the case.
Proposition 2 Let the parameters a, b and c in equation (36) be given by equations (37), (38)
and (39), respectively, where  > 0,  > 1 and 0 < ;  < 1. Then the two solutions of equation
(36) are real numbers.
Equation (36) has therefore two real solutions, given by
( 1; 

2) =
 b pb2   4ac
2a
;
 b+pb2   4ac
2a

:
It is also possible to show that the solutions for both   and n have to be positive. To see
this, dene
n1 (
)  1 +   
(1 )


;
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n2 (
)  
1  (1  )  :
The function n1 (
) is obtained by solving for n1 in equation (35). The solutions for 
n and  
are given by the two points of intersection of both functions in ( ; n) space. Both functions
are increasing in  . For   < 0, n1 (
) > 1+

and n2 (
) < . Since 1+

> , there can
be no solution for   < 0. But if   > 0, then n2 (
) >  > 0, which implies that n must be
positive too.
3.2 Convergence
Equation (36) has two real solutions,  1 and 

2, where 

1 < 

2. However, only 

1 implies
convergent dynamics. To see this, notice that a rms relative price and employment stock
evolve according to "
Et ~Pt+1(i)
~nt+1(i)
#
=
"
 + (1  ) n 0
 n 0
#"
~Pt(i)
~nt(i)
#
:
This system implies convergent dynamics only if the eigenvalues of the matrix are inside the
unit circle. These eigenvalues are 0 and  + (1  ) n. Since  + (1  ) n > 0 (as a result
of both   and n being positive), a non-explosive solution must satisfy + (1  ) n < 1, or
simply
 n < 1:
Using equation (31), this requires in turn
  <
1

: (40)
Dene
F ( )  a( )2 + b  + c;
where a, b and c are given by equations (37), (38) and (39), respectively. Since F ( ) is a
convex function, it follows that F ( ) < 0 ,   2 ( 1;  2), where  1;  2 are the two roots of
F ( ). Evaluating F () at 1

, I obtain
F

1


= (1 + )
1

(1  ) 

1

+ (2     )

+ (1  )
=   

< 0:
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It follows that  1 <
1

<  2, which means that 

2 violates (40) and therefore implies explosive
dynamics. As emphasized by Woodford (2005), in order for a log-linear approximation around
the steady-state to be an accurate approximation of the models exact equilibrium conditions,
the dynamics of rmsrelative prices and employment stocks must remain forever near enough
to the steady state. Since  2 violates this condition, from now onwards I will set 
 =  1.
4 Ination dynamics and real rigidities
The average pricing decision, equation (34), can be written as
(1 + ) logP t = (1  ) [cmct + (1 + ) logPt] + Et(1 + ) logP t+1; (41)
The Calvo model of staggered price-setting implies the following law of motion for the price
level,
P 1 t = P
1 
t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1  :
This admits the following log-linear approximation,
t =

1   (logP

t   logPt) ; (42)
where t  log(Pt= logPt 1) is the ination rate. Combining (41) and (42), I obtain the familiar
New Keynesian Phillips curve,
t = cmct + Ett+1; (43)
where
  (1  )(1  )

1
1 + 
; (44)
     n (45)
and average real marginal costs, cmct, are given by equation (26).
The parameter  has two components,  and n. The term  reects the fact that
labor disutility, and hence the real wage, are convex functions of hours worked ( > 0). In other
words, the marginal real wage is increasing in hours. Since hours are increasing in output, the
rms marginal cost curve becomes upward-sloping. In other words, the model displays real
rigidities in the sense of Ball and Romer (1990). Real rigidities have the e¤ect of reducing the
size of individual price changes in response to the same macroeconomic uctuations. To see
this, take a price-setter that is considering a reduction in its price. For a given overall price level,
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a reduction in the rms price increases its sales and therefore, for a given employment stock,
the required amount of hours per worker. This increases the rms marginal costs through the
increase in workersmarginal disutility of labor. The anticipated rise in current and future
expected real marginal costs leads the rm to choose a smaller price cut than the one initially
considered. This mechanism is absent in the case of a frictionless labor market, where rms
can hire as much labor as they want at the market hourly wage.
The term n reects the fact that the position of a rms marginal cost curve depends
on its stock of workers, by a¤ecting how many hours per worker are needed to produce a certain
amount of output. This term has the e¤ect of accelerating price adjustment. To see this, take
the same rm considering a price cut. From Proposition 1, todays price cut leads the rm to
expect a larger relative employment stock, and by equation (25) a lower marginal cost in future
periods. Holding everything else constant, this would lead the rm to choose an even larger
price cut than initially considered.
It is possible to show however that the rst e¤ect always dominates the second. Using the
denition of n, equation (31), I can write
   n =    


1  (1  ) 

= 

1  
2
1  (1  ) 

:
The latter expression is positive only if the expression in brackets is. Given that   must be
smaller than 1

in order for the model to have convergent dynamics, it follows that
1  
2
1  (1  )  > 1 
2
1  (1  ) 1

= 1   > 0:
It follows that the parameter  in expression (44) is strictly positive. Therefore, the real
rigidities arising from search frictions and the rm-specicity of labor have the e¤ect of reducing
the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
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4.1 Comparison to a standard New Keynesian model
As is well-known, a New Keynesian model with a perfectly competitive labor market produces
the following ination equation,11
t = nkcmcnkt + Ett+1; (46)
where
nk  (1  )(1  )

(47)
and cmcnkt =   +  1 c^t   (1 + )at (48)
are average real marginal costs.12 Therefore, the ination equation has the same form in
both models. What is di¤erent is the slope of the ination equation, which can be seen by
comparing expressions (44) and (47). In the model with search frictions, the presence of real
rigidities ( > 0) reduces the slope of the ination equation. The ip side of the coin is that,
given an econometric estimate of , the standard model implies a larger fraction of sticky prices,
. This in turn implies a longer average duration of price contracts, 1
1  . As emphasized by
Altig et al. (2004) and Woodford (2005), the standard New Keynesian model with perfectly
competitive factor markets requires an unrealistically long duration of prices in order to match
econometric estimates of . It is the contrast between the long price duration needed for the
standard model to match the macro evidence and the short price duration found in micro data
that Altig et al. (2004) have called the macro-micro pricing conict. As I have shown, the
introduction of search frictions into the New Keynesian model helps resolve this conict. The
next section quanties the importance of this mechanism.
5 Quantitative analysis
5.1 Calibration
I calibrate the model to US data. As emphasized by the recent literature on the cyclical
properties of the search and matching model, a monthly model frequency is better able to
11See e.g. Walsh (2003a).
12Since there is no vacancy posting in the standard model, output equals consumption, y^t = c^t. Also, since
the standard model makes no distinction between employment and hours per employee, real marginal costs do
not depend on n^t.
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capture the dynamics of labor market ows in the US than a quarterly one.13 I therefore
assume a monthly frequency for the model.
Following most of the RBC literature, I set the discount factor to 4% per quarter, or
 = 0:991=3. I also choose standard values for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
 = 1, and the autocorrelation of the technology shock, a = 0:95
1=3.
Calibrating the convexity of labor disutility, , requires more attention. In a standard
RBC framework, this parameter represents the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply. This
interpretation does not carry over to this context, because it is the rm, not the workers, who
sets hours per worker. It is however possible to derive an alternative interpretation for . Given
the wage equation (16) and the form of the labor disutility function, v(h) = (1 + ) 1h1+, the
marginal wage is given by
@wt(i)
@ht(i)
= 
ht (i)
u0(ct)
:
Therefore,  represents the elasticity of the marginal wage with respect to hours per worker.
Using US manufacturing data, Bils (1987) constructs a measure of marginal wages by assuming
an overtime premium of 50% and estimating by how much average overtime hours increase
following an increase in average hours per worker. He then estimates an elasticity of marginal
wages with respect to hours per worker of 1.39. Therefore, I set  to 1.4.
Regarding the New Keynesian side of the model, following Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004) I
assume that rms change prices every 1.5 quarters, or 4.5 months, which implies  = 4:5 1
4:5
=
0:78. As in Woodford, I choose a monopolistic mark-up of  = 1:15, which implies  = 
1  =
7:67. Following Cooley and Quadrini (1999), the autocorrelation of the monetary shock is set
to m = 0:49
1=3.
Given the values of , ;  and , equations (35) and (31) jointly imply   = 0:072 and
n = 6:80. From equation (45), the parameter  equals 3:35. From equation (44), the slope of
the Phillips curve equals  = 0:015. This compares to a slope of nk = 0:064 in the standard
New Keynesian model.
The parameters that describe the labor market (; p(); ) are calibrated as in Thomas
(2007), based also on US data (see Table 1 for details). In the absence of direct evidence on
the bargaining power parameter, , I follow most of the literature and set it equal to , which
would guarantee e¢ ciency in the absence of price stickiness and monopolistic competition. It
is however important to emphasize that  has no e¤ect on the parameter , and therefore on
how the fraction of price stickiness, , maps into the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve,
. Finally, the steady-state share of vacancy posting costs in GDP, sv, is derived from equation
13See e.g. Hall (2005), Shimer (2005) and Gertler and Trigari (2006).
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Value Description Value Description
 0.991=3 discount factor  0.6 rms bargaining power
 1.4 elasticity of marginal wages a 0.95
1=3 AC of technology shock
 0.78 fraction of sticky prices m 0.49
1=3 AC of monetary shock
 7.67 elasticity of demand curves   0.072 elast. of relative pricing decisions
 1 intertemporal elast. of subst. n 6.80 elasticity of relative employment
 0.035 job separation rate  3.35 (net) real rigidity
p() 0.30 job nding rate  0.015 slope of Phillips curve (PC)
 0.6 elasticity of matching function nk 0.064 slope of PC, standard model
sv 0.013 hiring costs/GDP
Table 1: Parameter values
(20) in the steady state.
5.2 Model response to shocks
The main objective of this paper is to quantify the extent to which search frictions and the
resulting real rigidities help resolve the macro-micro pricing conict, as measured by the di-
vergence between micro estimates of the average frequency of price adjustment and the model
frequency implied by macro estimates of the New Keynesian Phillips curve. However, it is also
interesting to simulate the economys response to monetary and technology shocks, in order to
assess the plausibility of these responses. I turn to this now.14
5.2.1 Monetary shocks
Figure 1 plots the economys response to a 1% shock to money growth. The output response is
hump-shaped, with a peak after almost two quarters. Ination jumps on impact and then decays
slowly. This contradicts the sluggish response of ination to monetary shocks as identied for
instance by Christiano et al. (2005). This problem is shared by the standard New Keynesian
model, and in both cases the reason is the absence of inherent persistence in the ination
process.
Both labor margins increase following the shock. However, hours respond more strongly than
employment. As shown by Trigari (2005), employment is more volatile than hours conditional
on monetary shocks. The reason for this counterfactual behaviour may be related to the
fact that wages are exible in this framework. As emphasized by Shimer (2005), period-by-
14In order to simulate the response to shocks, the model is log-linearized around a zero ination steady state.
The log-linear equations are described in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a monetary shock
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period Nash wage bargaining tends to mute the response of unemployment to shocks. Since
employment is the symmetric of unemployment, this would also explain why employment does
not vary much in response to a monetary shock. Therefore, some form of wage rigidity may be
needed so as to amplify the e¤ect of monetary shocks on employment. Since hours per worker
are given by h^t = y^t n^t conditional on monetary shocks, a stronger employment response would
also weaken the hours response given the same expansion in aggregate demand. Analyzing the
role of real wage rigidities in this framework however is beyond the scope of this paper.15
5.2.2 Productivity shocks
Figure 2 plots the economys response to a 1% positive technology shock. The improvement
in productivity leads rms to charge lower prices, bringing ination down. This creates a
persistent surge in aggregate demand. However, the increase in aggregate demand is lower
than the increase in productivity, which reduces rmstotal labor input requirements. These
results are consistent with a body of evidence starting with Gali (1999), although the sign
of the labor input response to a technology shock remains a matter of controversy in the
literature. Once again, the hours response is stronger than the employment response. In this
case, the employment response is particularly weak, especially when compared to the response
to a monetary shock. Again, this is probably reecting the exible nature of wages and the
resulting dampening of employment uctuations.
5.3 Inference about the frequency of price adjustment
I now tackle the central issue of this paper, which is how much search frictions contribute to
resolving the macro-micro pricing conict. Following Woodford (2005), I do so by comparing
the respective average frequencies of price adjustment implied by the model with search frictions
and the standard New Keynesian model, given hypothetical estimates of the slope of the New
Keynesian Phillips curve.
Most empirical estimates of the New Keynesian Phillips curve use the (log) labor share of
GDP as a proxy for average (log) real marginal costs, which are not observable, exploiting the
fact that average real marginal costs in the standard New Keynesian model are indeed equal
to the models labor share of GDP. When one is comparing the average frequency of price
adjustment implied by the standard and an alternative model, as long as the alternative model
15See Kuester (2007) for an analysis of how the interaction of staggered nominal wage bargaining and real
rigidity in wage bargaining gives rise to real wage rigidity, and how this helps increase the volatility of the
extensive margin of labor.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a technology shock
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produces an expression for the average real marginal cost which is equal to the labor share of
GDP, one can then use the same value of the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve in order
to infer price adjustment frequencies. This is the approach followed by Altig et al. (2004) and
Woodford (2005).
This presents a complication for the comparison between the model with search frictions and
the standard model, because in the former case average (log) real marginal costs are generally
di¤erent from the (log) labor share of GDP. Real marginal costs are given by the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, h

t (i)
c
 1=
t
, divided by the marginal product
of labor, yt(i)
nt(i)ht(i)
. This can be written as
mct(i) =
wt(i)nt(i)
yt(i)
ht (i)c
1=
t
wt(i)=ht(i)
; (49)
where wt(i) is total (not hourly) compensation. This would imply the following log-linear
approximation of average real marginal costs,
cmct = s^l + (1 + )h^t +  1c^t   w^t; (50)
where s^l  w^t + n^t   y^t is the log deviation of the labor share of GDP from its steady state
value.16 The problem of using the right hand side of equation (50) as a proxy for real marginal
costs is that, in order to identify the slope of the Phillips curve (), one needs to assume a value
for either  (the convexity of labor disutility) or  (the intertemporal elasticity of substitution),
parameters which are not directly observable and can only be estimated at best. This would
introduce an element of arbitrariness in the estimation of .
In order to avoid this problem, I start by noticing that the bargaining power parameter
has no e¤ect on the parameter , and therefore on the mapping between the fraction of sticky
prices, , and the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, . Therefore, my analysis of
average frequencies of price adjustment remains completely una¤ected if I assume that rms
have all the bargaining power,  = 1. In this case, worker surplus in every rm drops to zero
and workers are exactly compensated for their labor disutility (in terms of consumption),
w=1t (i) =
1
1 + 
h1+t (i)
c
 1=
t
:
16In the more general case of a Cobb-Douglas production function with elasticity  with respect to labor, the
marginal product of labor is  yt(i)nt(i)ht(i) . Real marginal costs would be proportional to the right hand side of
equation (49), which would imply again equation (50).
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 Search frictions Standard NK
0.025 0.696 0.855
0.02 0.733 0.869
0.015 0.776 0.887
Table 2: Fraction of sticky prices implied by di¤erent estimates of the slope of the ination
equation
The ratio of the marginal rate of substitution to the average hourly wage is now given by
ht (i)c
1=
t
w=1t (i)=ht(i)
= 1 + :
This, together with equation (49), implies the following expression for real marginal costs,
mc=1t (i) =
wt(i)nt(i)
yt(i)
(1 + ) :
Log-linearizing and averaging, I nally obtain
cmc=1t = s^l:
Therefore, under the assumption that rms have full bargaining power, the (log)share of GDP
is a correct proxy for average (log)real marginal costs both for the standard New Keynesian
model and the model with search frictions. As a consequence, if one were to estimate the New
Keynesian Phillips curve, the estimate of  would be the same regardless of which model one
had in mind. I can then use the same value of  in order to infer the average frequency of price
adjustment implied by the model with search frictions and the standard model.
Figure 3 plots the slope of the ination equation in each model as a function of , under
my calibration of the other structural parameters. In the model with search frictions, the
presence of real rigidities reduces the slope of the ination equation relative to the standard
New Keynesian model. The ip side of the coin is that, given any estimate of , the standard
model implies a larger fraction of sticky prices, .
Table 2 displays the value of  implied by several hypothetical estimates of  for each model.
I assume values of  that are close to those provided by the empirical literature, and the last
row uses the value of  implied by my calibration.17
17Using US data, Gali and Gertler (1999) provide an estimate of 0.023, whereas Sbordone (2004) obtains an
estimate of 0.025.
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Figure 3: Slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve as a function of the fraction of sticky
prices
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 Search frictions Standard NK
0.025 3.3 6.9
0.02 3.7 7.6
0.015 4.5 8.8
Table 3: Average duration of price contracts, in months
Given the values of , I can calculate the corresponding average duration of price contracts,
1
1  . Table 3 shows the average duration of price contracts for each value of  and for each
model.
In all cases, the average duration of price contracts implied by the model with search frictions
is roughly half of that implied by the standard model. For instance, under my baseline value
of , the model with search frictions implies an average price duration of 4.5 months.18 This is
roughly the average frequency of price adjustment found in micro data (Bils and Klenow, 2004;
Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2004). The standard model however would imply an average duration
of price contracts of almost 9 months, which is almost one and a half quarters longer than
what micro data suggests is a plausible duration. These results suggest that search frictions
and the resulting real rigidities may be useful in reconciling the average frequency of price
adjustment implied by macroeconometric estimates of the New Keynesian Phillips curve with
the frequencies usually found in micro data.
6 Conclusion
A recent literature has pointed to the following deciency in the standard New Keynesian
model. In order to match macro-econometric estimates of the slope coe¢ cient of the New
Keynesian Phillips curve, one needs to assume an average duration of price contracts which
is much longer than the average duration typically found in the micro data. Some authors
have called this the macro-micro pricing conict. The same literature has blamed this conict
on the lack of real rigidities (in the sense of Ball and Romer, 1990) in the standard model,
which stems from the assumption of perfectly competitive markets for homogenous factors of
production.
This paper shows how departing from the assumption of a perfectly competitive labor market
can generate real rigidities and how this helps resolve the pricing conict. I do so by introducing
search and matching frictions in the labor market into the New Keynesian model. Because of
the time involved in hiring workers, in the short run rms can only adjust hours per worker so
18Notice that this is by construction: in my baseline calibration, I assume a pricing frequency of 4.5 months.
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as to meet demand. Workers however must be compensated for their labor disutility. Under
the realistic assumption that labor disutility is convex in hours worked, short-run marginal cost
curves become upward-sloping. That is, the model gives rise to real rigidities. This mechanism
leads rms to make smaller price changes in response to the same macroeconomic impulses,
because they internalize the e¤ect of their pricing (production) decisions on their own marginal
costs. Once all pricing decisions are aggregated, real rigidities have the e¤ect of reducing the
slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Therefore, for the same estimate of this slope, the
model with search frictions implies an average duration of price contracts which is shorter than
in the standard model and therefore closer to the micro evidence.
For future research, it would be interesting to introduce ring costs into the present context.
By a¤ecting the marginal cost of adjusting employment, ring costs will a¤ect how rms allocate
their labor-input needs between employment and hours. This in turn will a¤ect the degree of
real rigidities in the New Keynesian model and therefore the relationship between the average
frequency of price adjustment and the slope of the Phillips curve. Given the size of ring costs
in countries like Germany, France, Italy and Spain, this may be an important topic in the
context of research on the monetary transmission mechanism in the euro area.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From equation (29) in the text, we can write the rms vacancy posting decision as
sv

(1  )^t = Et

1


~ht+1(i) + h^t+1 +
 1
1 + 
c^t+1

  p()Swy
h
^t+1 + ^t+1;t+2 + S^
w
t+2
i
+
sv

Et^t;t+1 + (1  )
sv

(1  )Et^t+1; (A1)
where ~ht+1(i) = h^t+1(i)   h^t+1 is the rms relative number of hours per worker. Hours per
worker admit the following exact log-linear representation
h^t(i) = y^
d
t (i)  at   n^t(i):
Therefore, I can write ~ht(i) = ~ydt (i)  ~nt(i). This becomes
~ht(i) =   ~Pt(i)  ~nt(i)
once I use the fact that ~ydt (i) =   ~Pt. The rms expected relative price is given by
Et ~Pt+1(i) = Et (logPt(i)  logPt+1) + (1  )Et
 
logP t+1(i)  logPt+1

= Et

~Pt(i)  t+1

+ (1  )Et

logP t+1(i)  logP t+1 +

1  t+1

=  ~Pt(i)  (1  ) ~nt+1(i):
In the second equality I have used the fact that, in the Calvo model, logP t+1   logPt+1 =

1 t+1, where t  log(Pt=Pt+1) is the ination rate. In the third equality I have used
logP t+1(i)  logP t+1 =   ~nt+1(i). Expected relative hours are then given by
Et~ht+1(i) =  Et ~Pt+1(i)  ~nt+1(i) (A2)
=   ~Pt(i)  [1  (1  ) ] ~nt+1(i):
Averaging (A1) across all rms and substracting the resulting expression from (A1) yields
Et~ht+1(i) = 0. Combining this with (A2), I nally obtain
~nt+1(i) =   
1  (1  ) 
~Pt(i):
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7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Using equations (37), (38) and (39), the inequality b2 > 4ac can be written as
[1 + (2     )]2 > 4(1 + )(1  )(1  ):
This in turn can be written as
(1 + )2 + [(1     )]2 > 2(1 + ) (1  )(1  ) + 2 :
This can be written as
(1 + )

1 +    (1  )(1  ) + 2 	
+

(1     )2   (1  )(1  ) + 2 (1 + )	 > 0:
I can write the latter as
(1 + ) f1 +  [1   + (1  )] g
   [1   + (1  )]  + (1  )(1  ) + 2	 > 0:
This can be expressed as
1 + ()2  f1   + (1  )  [1   + (1  )]g
+

 [1   + (1  )] + 1  (1  )(1  ) + 2	 > 0:
Cancelling terms, I can nally write
1 + ()2 2(1  )2 + 2 [1   + (1  )] > 0;
which holds for any ;  2 [0; 1].
7.3 The model in log-linear form
I now obtain the log-linear equations of the model with search frictions.
 Ination,
t = cmct + Ett+1:
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 Average real marginal costs,
cmct = y^t +  1c^t   (1 + )at   n^t:
 Aggregate demand,
y^t = scc^t + svv^t;
where sv  vy and sc = 1  sv.
 Private consumption,
c^t = c^t 1 + ut   t:
 Vacancies,
v^t = ^t + u^t:
 Unemployment,
u^t =  n
u
n^t;
where u = 
+p()
and u = 1  n.
 Employment,
n^t+1 = (1    p())n^t + ^t;
 Labor market tightness,
sv

(1 )^t = sv

Et^t;t+1+



1 + 

h^t+1 +
 1

c^t+1   sw
¯
bw
¯ t+1

+ (1  )sv

(1  )^t+1

:
 Average hours per worker,
h^t = y^t   at   n^t:
 Outside opportunities,
sw
¯
bw
¯ t
=
1


h^t +
 1
1 + 
c^t

+ p()Swy
h
^t + Et

^t;t+1 + S^
w
t+1
i
;
where sw
¯
 nw
y¯
and Swy  nS
w
y
.
 Average worker surplus,
Swy S^
w
t = sww^t   sw¯ bw¯ t + (1  )Swy Et(^t;t+1 + S^wt+1);
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where sw  nwy .
 Average real wage,
sww^t = (1  ) (y^t   n^t) + sw
¯
bw
¯ t
:
 Stochastic discount factor,
^t;t+1 = 
 1(c^t   c^t+1):
 Money growth shock,
ut = mut 1 + "
m
t ;
where "mt  iid(0; 2m).
 Technology shock,
at = aat 1 + "
a
t ;
where "at  iid(0; 2a).
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